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INTRODUCTION
“Everybody should get to vote, no matter what color you are.”1 In 2018, this seductive phrase refers not to African American voting rights in the U.S. South, but to a
white male’s attempt to vote in a political-status plebiscite reserved for “native inhabitants of Guam.”2 Arnold Davis, a white U.S. citizen and Guam resident,3 represented
* Associate Faculty Specialist; Associate Director, Ka Huli Ao Center for Excellence in Native Hawaiian Law; Associate Director of Legal Writing, William S. Richardson School of Law,
University of Hawai‘i at MƗnoa. Many thanks to Eric Yamamoto, Dina Shek, and Avis Poai for
their valuable suggestions. Thank you also to the editors of the William & Mary Bill of Rights
Journal for their excellent editorial work.
1
Jasmine Stole Weiss, Judge to Decide on Plebiscite Challenge, PAC. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 2,
2016), https://www.guampdn.com/videos/news/2016/09/01/89687134 [https://perma.cc/X95E
-XFY4]. See also Jasmine Stole Weiss, Guam Chief Judge Frances Tydingco-Gatewood to Decide on Plebiscite Case, PAC. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 2, 2016, 12:46 AM), https://www.guampdn
.com/story/news/2016/09/01/guam-chief-judge-frances-tydingco-gatewood-decide-plebiscite
-case/89686794 [https://perma.cc/ZHD4-A9MN] [hereinafter Weiss, Guam Chief Judge to Decide on Plebiscite Case]; Jasmine Stole Weiss & Jerick Sablan, Judge: Plebiscite Law Unconstitutional; AG May Appeal, PAC. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.guampdn.com/story
/news/2017/03/08/judge-arnold-davis-plebiscite-law-unconstitutional/98888880 [https://perma.cc
/XP79-JC89].
2
Guam Inexplicably Delays Appeal, CTR. INDIVIDUAL RTS. (Apr. 13, 2018), https://
www.cir-usa.org/2018/04/guam-inexplicably-delays-appeal [https://perma.cc/FBG9-CHA8].
See also Weiss, Guam Chief Judge to Decide on Plebiscite Case, supra note 1.
3
Davis v. Guam, CTR. INDIVIDUAL RTS. (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.cir-usa.org/cases/da
vis-v-guam [https://perma.cc/CU5V-P8XZ] [hereinafter Davis. v. Guam, CTR. INDIVIDUAL RTS.].

501

502

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 27:501

by anti-affirmative action and conservative election attorneys,4 sued the Territory
of Guam for alleged violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution.5 He contended that Guam’s Decolonization Registry Law6
unlawfully discriminated against him by prohibiting him from registering to participate in a future, largely symbolic, decolonization plebiscite.7 The law allows eligible
“native inhabitants”—those who became U.S. citizens pursuant to Guam’s 1950
Organic Act and their descendants—to choose between independence, free association with the United States, or statehood,8 as an expression of their long-awaited
self-determination as an integral part of decolonization.9
Davis argued that Guam’s “denial of [his] right to register and . . . vote constitute[d] racial discrimination that categorically violate[d] one of his most fundamental rights as a citizen of our democracy.”10 The conservative advocacy group
representing Davis, the Center for Individual Rights, called the “native inhabitant”
4

Davis’s attorneys include the Center for Individual Rights (CIR) and J. Christian Adams.
Id. CIR is a conservative non-profit law firm “dedicated to the defense of individual liberties
against the increasingly aggressive and unchecked authority of federal and state governments.”
Mission, CTR. INDIVIDUAL RTS., https://www.cir-usa.org/mission [https://perma.cc/S95N
-EGPG]. Among other things, it uses litigation, networking, and messaging strategies to challenge “affirmative action, civil rights, and racial equality.” LEE COKORINOS, THE ASSAULT ON
DIVERSITY: AN ORGANIZED CHALLENGE TO RACIAL AND GENDER JUSTICE 59–61 (2003). J.
Christian Adams, President and General Counsel of the Public Interest Legal Foundation, is
a conservative attorney and activist responsible for aggressive voter-purge lawsuits against
several counties, and whose organization alleges that an “alien invasion” is committing rampant
voter fraud. Pema Levy, These Three Lawyers Are Quietly Purging Voter Rolls Across the
Country, MOTHER JONES (July 7, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/20
17/07/these-three-lawyers-are-quietly-purging-voter-rolls-across-the-country [https://perma
.cc/SZX7-XLAR] (outlining Adams’s voter purge lawsuits targeting districts with histories
of discrimination against people of color); Jane C. Timm, Vote Fraud Crusader J. Christian
Adams Sparks Outrage, NBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2017, 6:13 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com
/politics/donald-trump/vote-fraud-crusader-j-christian-adams-sparks-outrage-n796026
[https://perma.cc/PMH5-4FZT] (describing the Public Interest Legal Foundation’s controversial two-part “Alien Invasion” voter fraud reports).
5
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Davis v.
Guam, 2017 WL 930825 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017) (No. 11-00035) [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot. for
Summ. J.].
6
3 GUAM CODE ANN. § 21000 (2000) amended by Guam Pub. L. 33-148 (2016).
7
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 at 1, Davis
v. Guam, 2017 WL 930825 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017) (No. 11-00035) [hereinafter Defs.’ Mot.
for Summ. J.]. Guam’s Commission on Decolonization is tasked with ascertaining native inhabitants’ desired future political relationship with the United States. Davis v. Guam, 785 F.3d 1311,
1313 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 1 GUAM CODE ANN. § 2105 (2000)).
8
Davis, 785 F.3d at 1313 (citing 1 GUAM CODE ANN. § 2110 (2000)).
9
3 GUAM CODE ANN. § 21000 (seeking to further Congress’s commitment to repair the
harms of U.S. colonization by permitting “the native inhabitants of Guam . . . to exercise the
inalienable right to self-determination”).
10
Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 5, at 2.
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classification an “odious” tactic “of building a racial identity for a favored ‘native’
race in opposition to ‘other’ races.”11 Davis and his attorneys thus distorted the rhetoric
of civil rights to erase the history and impacts of colonization in Guam for the benefit
of white American Arnold Davis. In an opinion devoid of that historical context, the
District Court of Guam held that Guam “used ancestry as a proxy for race” and
unlawfully discriminated in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.12
At the time of this writing, the case is on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.13
The Davis case is not simply about a little-known non-binding plebiscite in a
non-self-governing colony of the United States. It is yet another “reverse discrimination” lawsuit in the style of Rice v. Cayetano,14 in which the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that a Native Hawaiian voting limitation was an unlawful proxy for race.15 As
in Rice, Davis and his supporters deployed a twisted civil-rights paradigm that
ignores the history of colonization and discounts the difference between concepts
of equality and Indigenous self-determination.16 And like the Supreme Court’s
modern anti-affirmative action cases,17 Davis and his attorneys treated all classifications as the same—whether they were designed to end an oppressive system or to
perpetuate it.18 The Davis case is thus part of a larger movement to dismantle civil
and human rights for people of color and Indigenous people nationwide.19
The Davis case also illuminates the pressing need for an appropriate approach
for reviewing ancestry-based classifications in this context. The Court’s current
approach treats non-tribal Native peoples’ present-day efforts to restore self-determination not as “political” restorative measures but as simple racial preferences.20 The
11

Davis v. Guam, CTR. INDIVIDUAL RTS., supra note 3. See also Hans A. von Spakovsky,
Jim Crow Rears Its Ugly Head in Guam, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 30, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://
www.nationalreview.com/2016/08/guam-voting-registration-rights-native-inhabitants-racial
-discrimination [https://perma.cc/Z572-AW6Y] (calling Guam’s law a “modern, progressive
‘identity politics’ version of Jim Crow discrimination”).
12
Davis v. Guam, No. 11-00035, slip op. at *8, *14–15 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017).
13
See Defendants’ Notice of Appeal, Davis v. Guam, No. 11-00035 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2017).
14
528 U.S. 495 (2000).
15
Id. at 514. See also Eric K. Yamamoto, The Colonizer’s Story: The Supreme Court Violates Native Hawaiian Sovereignty—Again, COLORLINES (Aug. 20, 2000, 12:00 PM), http://
www.colorlines.com/articles/colonizers-story-supreme-court-violates-native-hawaiian-sover
eignty-again [https://perma.cc/FW6E-73GV] [hereinafter Yamamoto, Colonizer’s Story].
16
See Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 5, at 2.
17
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989).
18
See infra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
20
See, e.g., Rice, 528 U.S. at 516–17; see also Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari:
Indian Political Rights as Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 996–98 (2011) (contending
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Court’s framing fails to apprehend accurately both the way ancestry and race have
been deployed to subjugate Native people, as well as the meanings of indigeneity
and human rights for the Native communities involved.21
Consistent with the notion of “reparative justice,”22 ancestry should not be
treated as race, particularly in the context of remedies for the harms of U.S. colonization. The purpose of such remedial measures is not to target race itself, but rather the
damage of colonization.23 Justice Stevens recognized this idea in his Rice dissent:
Hawai‘i’s Native Hawaiian voting limitation was not enacted “on account of race,”24
but was based on the assumption that the law’s beneficiaries “have a claim to compensation and self-determination that others do not.”25 This approach thus distinguishes
between an ancestry-based classification that fosters a historically colonized group’s
self-determination and one that is designed to perpetuate historical racial oppression.
This restorative approach also acknowledges that the international human rights
principle of self-determination, a central tenet of reparative justice, is key to colonized peoples’ efforts worldwide to repair the damage of historical injustice.26 Selfdetermination entails repairing the persisting harms suffered by those who have
experienced systemic oppression according to their self-shaped notions of reparation.27
This approach is also consistent with the Fifteenth Amendment and the jurisprudential underpinnings of existing case law.28
Some reparative-justice classifications do employ blood-quantum requirements
or otherwise use language colloquially described as “race.”29 But those references
that the tension between “political” and “racial” jurisprudence was critical to the Rice Court’s
decision); Yamamoto, Colonizer’s Story, supra note 15 (describing the Rice Court’s transformation of a Native Hawaiian self-determination measure into a “reverse discrimination” civilrights violation).
21
See Rolnick, supra note 20, at 967–68.
22
See infra notes 167–80 and accompanying text. This Article uses both “reparative” and
“restorative” to mean repairing the persisting damage of a specific injustice according to the
self-determined dictates or wishes of the communities involved.
23
See Rice, 528 U.S. at 527–46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24
Id. at 539 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1).
25
Id. at 545.
26
See Eric K. Yamamoto, Miyoko Pettit & Sara Lee, Unfinished Business: A Joint South
Korea and United States Jeju 4.3 Tragedy Task Force to Further Implement Recommendations
and Foster Comprehensive and Enduring Social Healing Through Justice, 15 ASIAN-PAC.
L. & POL’Y J. 1, 21 (2014).
27
See Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation: Redressing
the Legacy of Radioactive Contamination for Native Peoples and Native Lands, 13 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 203, 245 (2015); Carlton Waterhouse, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly:
Moral Agency and the Role of Victims in Reparations Programs, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 257,
267–68 (2009); Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye Yun Kim & Abigail M. Holden, American
Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 16 (2007).
28
See U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 1; Rice, 528 U.S. at 517, 540, 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29
See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th
Cir. 1990).
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do not transform a politically crafted remedial law aimed at rectifying the harms of
colonization to an Indigenous people into an impermissible racial classification. As
international scholar Albert Memmi aptly observed, the colonizer gains control over
land and resources, and legitimates it, in part by disparaging Native peoples.30 That
vilification—characterizing the colonized as inferior and unworthy—takes many
forms, including negative cultural imagery about the group and its ancestry.31 The
restorative-justice approach to remedying those material and cultural harms of colonization, therefore, must take into account that ancestry. And a law based on that deeply
reparative-justice approach does not convert an ancestral classification into one that
merely—without strong justification—aims to benefit one racial group over another.
In light of Davis v. Guam and other challenges to laws seeking to remedy harms
of U.S. colonization,32 the court’s approach to analyzing ancestry-based classifications is crucial. The Ninth Circuit can adopt a narrow, formalist approach, and decide
that ancestry is always a proxy for race (as the district court seemed to do).33 Or, in
its inquiry into the law’s so-called “racial definition” and “racial purpose[,]”34 the
court can incorporate the context of colonization and its lasting damage to Native
peoples to acknowledge that ancestry is key to repairing those harms.35 This latter
approach—consistent with reparative-justice principles and the purpose of the Fifteenth
Amendment—properly recognizes that Guam’s “native inhabitants” classification is
30

See ALBERT MEMMI, RACISM 33–38 (Steve Martinot trans., Univ. Minn. Press 2000)
(1982) [hereinafter MEMMI, RACISM].
31
See id.; Susan K. Serrano, Collective Memory and the Persistence of Injustice: From
Hawai‘i’s Plantations to Congress—Puerto Ricans’ Claims to Membership in the Polity, 20
S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 353, 368–69 (2011) [hereinafter Serrano, Collective Memory].
32
See, e.g., Complaint at 2, United States v. Guam, No. 17-00113 (D. Guam) (filed Sept. 29,
2017) (challenging Guam’s Chamorro Land Trust Act under the Federal Fair Housing Act
for allegedly discriminating against non-Chamorros because the Trust provides special homelands leases and benefits to “native Chamorros”).
33
See Davis v. Guam, No. 11-00035, slip op. at *8 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017) (deciding that,
because Guam’s law treats Chamorros “as a ‘distinct people[,]’ . . . the Guam Legislature has
used ancestry as a proxy for race”).
34
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 515 (2000); Davis, 2017 WL 930825, at *8.
35
See Susan K. Serrano, Eric K. Yamamoto, Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie & David
M. Forman, Restorative Justice for Hawai‘i’s First People: Selected Amicus Curiae Briefs
in Doe v. Kamehameha Schools, 14 ASIAN AM. L.J. 217–22 (2007) [hereinafter Serrano et
al., Restorative Justice for Hawai‘i’s First People] (quoting Amicus Brief of the Japanese
American Citizens League of Hawai‘i–Honolulu Chapter et al. in Support of DefendantsAppellees’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi
Bishop Estate, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 931 (2007) [hereinafter
JACL–Hawai‘i Amicus Br.]); Rice, 528 U.S. at 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see generally
S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move Toward the
Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 15 (2004) (examining the international
human rights multicultural model in which “the terms of integration of indigenous people
into the social and political orders of states must allow them to continue to live with their
cultures intact”).
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not motivated by the exclusion of others on account of race, but seeks to remedy the
ongoing harms of U.S. colonization, particularly for the targeted Indigenous group.
Part I situates Davis in the broader context of today’s conservative dismantling
of rights for people of color and Native peoples through the co-optation of the
rhetoric of “equality.” Relatedly, this Part briefly describes the evolution of the courts’
“ancestry as proxy for race” inquiry that views race as devoid of social and political
meaning, and that treats recognition of ancestry as immediately suspect.
Part II introduces a theoretical approach for assessing ancestral classifications
grounded in reparative justice. This approach rests on two important theoretical
foundations: Albert Memmi’s groundbreaking theory of how race and ancestry are
used to justify colonization or political aggression; and the concept of reparative
justice, rooted in the international human rights principle of self-determination. Together, these theories point to a more appropriate method for assessing ancestrybased classifications in the context of remedies for the harms of U.S. colonization.
This Part concludes that, in assessing a colonized group’s attempts to restore a
measure of self-governance through a political-status plebiscite, the court’s inquiry
into the law’s so-called “racial definition” and “racial purpose” “must incorporate
the context of colonization and its resulting ‘devastation’” of that group.36
Part III analyzes the parties’ arguments and the district court’s decision in Davis
in light of these theoretical insights, and concludes that the Decolonization Registry
Law’s use of ancestry is a legitimate restorative response to colonialism’s devastation
in Guam. This approach is not only significant for the Davis case, but has broader
relevance for groups seeking both traditional and innovative remedies for the
persisting harms of colonization within the territorial confines of the United States.
I. DAVIS V. GUAM IN LEGAL-POLITICAL CONTEXT
Against the backdrop of ongoing assaults on affirmative action and social programs,37 Arnold Davis challenged Guam’s “native inhabitants” classification as a
“categorical” violation of his civil rights.38 His attorney, the well-known conservative
advocacy group, the Center for Individual Rights,39 accused Guam of singling out
36

See JACL–Hawai‘i Amicus Br., supra note 35, at 219.
See, e.g., Patricia Hurtado, Harvard Fights Broad Conservative Assault on Affirmative Action, Financial Advisor Magazine (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.fa-mag.com/news/harvard-fights
-broad-conservative-assault-on-affirmative-action-41364.html [https://perma.cc/7QDB-N7F6].
38
Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 5, at 1–2.
39
Among other campaigns, the Center for Individual Rights has successfully sued to eliminate affirmative-action programs in Texas, California, and Michigan. See Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244 (2003); Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000); Coal. for Econ.
Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 1997), amended by 122 F.3d 692 (Aug. 21,
1997) and amended by 122 F.3d 718 (Aug. 26, 1997); see also Civil Rights, CTR. INDIVIDUAL
RTS., https://www.cir-usa.org/case-types/civil-rights [https://perma.cc/ZPF2-MH2V] (describing the organization’s victories in the above-mentioned cases).
37
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a “favored ‘native’ race” for preferential treatment.40 Davis and his attorneys thus
twisted civil rights to discount the history and impacts of colonization in Guam.
But why attack a little-known non-binding plebiscite in a non-self-governing
colony of the United States? To understand why, the Davis case must be viewed as
part of the decades-long effort to dismantle civil rights in the federal courts and state
legislatures, and through voter initiatives.41
A. The Dismantling of Justice
Over the past forty years, a divided U.S. Supreme Court, supported by conservative think tanks and advocacy groups, has dismantled hard-earned civil rights for
African Americans and other racial groups. It has done so:
[U]nder the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by banning
claims of institutional discrimination, invalidating affirmative
action programs, limiting federal court powers to monitor school
desegregation, rejecting proof of racially discriminatory impact
in death-penalty sentencing, countermanding state voter redistricting designed to ensure that votes of minorities count, [and]
invalidating disability rights legislation.42
40

Davis v. Guam, CTR. INDIVIDUAL RTS., supra note 3.
See COKORINOS, supra note 4, at 18, 21 (describing right-wing attempts to dismantle
programs, laws, and policies aimed at racial and gender equality).
42
Eric Yamamoto, Susan K. Serrano, Minal Shah Fenton & James Gifford, Dismantling
Civil Rights: Multiracial Resistance and Reconstruction, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 523, 529 (2001)
[hereinafter Yamamoto et al., Dismantling Civil Rights]; Eric K. Yamamoto, Susan K. Serrano
& Michelle Natividad Rodriguez, American Racial Justice On Trial—Again: African American
Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1288 n.86
(2003). See also Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that
sovereign immunity insulated public university from liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (striking down Texas legislative districts as invidiously racist); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (holding that only residents of an allegedly
gerrymandered legislative district had standing to sue); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
v. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that all explicit racial classifications, whether invidious or restorative, must be reviewed under strict scrutiny); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)
(holding that a showing that race was a dominant and controlling rationale in legislative redistricting is sufficient to state an actionable claim for relief); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70
(1995) (striking down features of district court’s desegregation order as beyond the scope of the
court’s remedial authority); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding actionable a claim of
race-based legislative redistricting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
(striking down city policy requiring city construction contractors to subcontract a set quota of
business to minority-owned businesses); McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding
that statistics indicating racially disparate application of the death penalty do not themselves establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979) (holding state civil-service hiring preference for military veterans did not deprive women
of equal protection under the law because the law established a neutral preference for veterans
41
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The Court has further eroded civil rights by annulling an individual’s right to
enforce federal agency disparate-impact regulations under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act,43 “striking down [a] state constitutional provision [,] that provides Native
Hawaiian elections as a measure of self-determination,”44 rejecting a school district’s
attempts to achieve racial diversity,45 undermining disparate-impact cases on behalf
of people of color under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,46 and nullifying a key provision of the Voting Rights Act.47
Underlying today’s retreat from justice is the right’s strategic emphasis on
“color-blind” constitutionalism, where race-conscious remedies are now “reverse
racism” and assaults on “individual liberty.”48 With unacknowledged irony, the U.S.
Supreme Court has invoked the Fourteenth Amendment and the idea of “colorblindness” in favor of whites to overturn governmental efforts to remedy the effects
of long-standing discrimination against non-whites. For example, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, a reverse-discrimination case brought by white contractors,49
the Court held that all racial classifications—including affirmative-action programs
designed to remedy past discrimination—are subject to strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause, and are, therefore, presumptively invalid.50
Treating racial groups as “fungible” rather than deeply dependent on historical
and present-day socioeconomic context,51 the Supreme Court also has sharply limited
of either sex); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242–44 (1976) (upholding legality of policerecruiting procedures that have racially disparate outcomes, and holding that a law is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact, regardless of whether it
reflects a discriminatory purpose). The Court also narrowly redefined the reach of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause to block a congressional act civilly advancing women’s rights to
be free from violence, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and invalidated key
parts of age discrimination legislation, Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
43
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
44
Yamamoto et al., Dismantling Civil Rights, supra note 42, at 529–30.
45
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
46
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
47
See Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
48
Yamamoto et al., Dismantling Civil Rights, supra note 42, at 545. See also Cheryl I.
Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test
Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 82 (2010) (contending that the ideological and doctrinal reorientation that has constrained antidiscrimination law is not premised on the notion that “people
of all races are equally vulnerable to discrimination; rather, the underlying racial frame is that
present-day discrimination is largely a problem confronting whites”).
49
515 U.S. 200, 247 n.5 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50
Id. at 230 (1995) (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989))
(other citations omitted) (“[A]ny individual suffers an injury when he or she is disadvantaged
by the government because of his or her race, whatever that race may be.”). See also Cedric
Merlin Powell, Justice Thomas, Brown, and Post-Racial Determinism, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 451,
453 (2014) (“[E]quality essentially means the right to bring a reverse discrimination suit
premised on the ‘injury’ caused by any race-conscious remedy.”).
51
See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
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race-conscious educational programs.52 In Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District,53 for example, Chief Justice John Roberts turned Brown’s
anti-racism mandate on its head to discount any difference between a student-assignment plan that supported systemic racial subordination and one that endeavored
to dismantle it.54 A conservative advocacy group has now sued Harvard University
and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill to halt their race-conscious
admissions programs—this time using Asian American plaintiffs.55 And the Trump
Administration’s Department of Justice has pledged to investigate and sue universities over “policies deemed to discriminate against white applicants.”56
This formalistic color-blind approach disregards the historic purpose and original
meaning and intent of civil-rights laws, which took express account of the social and
political significance of race.57 The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, at the heart
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (2d ed. 1994) (debunking the idea that race is based on fixed,
biological characteristics, and describing the process of racialization, in which races are formed
and reformed and imbued with social meaning); see also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our
Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s reliance on conceptions of race that ignore social context and historical experience).
52
While affirmative-action programs in higher education generally persist, the Court has
tightly circumscribed the instances in which a racial classification is “narrowly tailored.” See
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (upholding “diversity” as a compelling
interest, but further limiting the “narrow tailoring” prong of strict-scrutiny review); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down the University of Michigan’s undergraduate raceconscious admissions program because it was not sufficiently narrowly tailored); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (upholding Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admissions program, but suggesting that “governmental use of race must have a logical end point”).
53
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
54
Id. at 746–48 (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”).
55
See Joan Biskupic, Harvard Fight Could Redirect 40 Years of Affirmative Action, CNN
(Aug. 6, 2017, 3:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/05/politics/affirmative-action-harvard
-justice-department/index.html [https://perma.cc/RP7D-UEBW]; Joseph P. Williams, Sessions
Says DOJ to Probe Harvard University on Affirmative Action, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 6, 2017, 2:09
PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-10-06/sessions-says-doj-to-probe
-harvard-university-on-affirmative-action [https://perma.cc/FT7Q-CQTR] (noting that the
same lawyer representing the anti-affirmative action plaintiffs against Harvard was the same
attorney who represented Abigail Fisher against the University of Texas).
56
Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. to Take On Affirmative Action in College Admissions, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2hmhgRS (quoting an internal Department of Justice
document that seeks attorneys to assist with “investigations and possible litigation related to
intentional race-based discrimination in college and university admissions”). These distortions
of civil rights reflect recent findings that a majority of whites believe that whites face discrimination, while a very small percentage say that they have actually experienced it. See Don
Gonyea, Majority of White Americans Say They Believe Whites Face Discrimination, NPR
(Oct. 24, 2017, 1:35 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/10/24/559604836/majority-of-white
-americans-think-theyre-discriminated-against [https://perma.cc/SRP7-JH8N].
57
See H.R. Rep. No. 914, at 18 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2393 (recognizing
expressly that the “[m]ost glaring” discrimination against any minority group in America was
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of the Davis case, were cornerstones of the Civil War Reconstruction that sought to
rectify the immense burdens on African Americans who had just emerged from years
of slavery and legalized oppression.58 At one time used as key tools to eliminate
state-sponsored systemic oppression against African Americans and other subordinated
groups,59 civil-rights laws now largely serve to safeguard the interests of whites.60
This co-optation of civil rights tightly constrains the rights of Indigenous peoples.61
It does so in part by discounting the history of colonization—the confiscation of land,
barring of language, suppression of identity, and loss of self-governance—and its
harsh present-day consequences.62 Once stripped of this historical and modern-day
context, “programs to uplift indigenous people in their homeland [are] recast as simply
wrong-headed ‘racial preferences.’”63 Politically, the success of these coordinated
reverse-discrimination legal challenges, discussed below, threaten Indigenous efforts
to restore a measure of self-determination and self-government.
B. Rice v. Cayetano: Ancestry as Proxy for Race
Davis’s case is tightly tied to the conservative dismantling of the Native Hawaiian
voting limitation in Rice v. Cayetano.64 In Rice, a white American rancher, Harold Rice,
appropriated the language of civil rights to challenge a requirement that individuals
against “Negroes[,]” who, “100 years after their formal emancipation,” were “not accorded
the rights, privileges, and opportunities which are considered to be, and must be, the birthright
of all citizens”).
58
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59
See id.
60
See Yamamoto et al., Dismantling Civil Rights, supra note 42, at 545; Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1772 (1993).
61
See Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV.
943 (2002) (describing the ways in which non-Indians attack benefits for Native Americans
using equal-rights rhetoric); see also Keith L. Camacho, After 9/11: Militarized Borders and
Social Movements in the Mariana Islands, 64 AM. Q. 685, 700 (2012) (contending that the
“major tenet of civil rights—that is, the equality of individuals within one nation—fails to consider concepts of sovereignty as they pertain to international law and to indigenous societies”);
J. KƝhaulani Kauanui, Colonialism in Equality: Hawaiian Sovereignty and the Question of
U.S. Civil Rights, 107 S. ATLANTIC Q. 635, 636 (2008) (arguing that the civil-rights paradigm
is inadequate to address issues of sovereignty, nationhood, “nation-to-nation governance and
land issues” for Native peoples). Rather than seeking equality under law or racial justice,
Indigenous people seek a form of governmental sovereignty and to connect with their own
knowledge systems, land, and life ways. See Yamamoto, Colonizer’s Story, supra note 15.
62
See Serrano et al., Restorative Justice for Hawai‘i’s First People, supra note 35, at
208–09.
63
Eric K. Yamamoto & Catherine Corpus Betts, Disfiguring Civil Rights to Deny Indigenous
Hawaiian Self-Determination: The Story of Rice v. Cayetano, in RACE LAW STORIES 566
(Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado eds., 2008).
64
528 U.S. 495 (2000).
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be Native Hawaiian to vote for trustees to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA),65
a semiautonomous organization created by the Hawai‘i state constitution to manage
certain funds and benefits for Native Hawaiians.66 Rice argued that the voting
structure unlawfully discriminated against non-Native Hawaiians in violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.67
Proclaiming that “[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race[,]”68 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the OHA voting structure violated the Fifteenth Amendment.69 According
to the Court, Hawai‘i’s law raised “grave concerns” because it “demean[ed] the dignity
and worth of a person[,]” impermissibly “generat[ed] . . . prejudice and hostility[,]”
and corrupted “the whole legal order democratic elections seek to preserve.”70 In
striking down the voting limitation, the Court determined that, when considering the
rights of Native Hawaiians, it must recount the immigration story of “many different
races and cultures” to Hawai‘i, and how those groups faced and overcame discrimination.71 The Court implicitly assumed that Native Hawaiians are similarly situated
to “Chinese, Portuguese, Japanese, and Filipinos[,]” who also had their “own history
in Hawaii,” their “own struggles with societal and official discrimination,” their
“own successes,” and their “own role in creating the present society of the islands.”72
In listing Hawai‘i’s immigrants, the Court conspicuously omitted whites, as if
European and American colonization never existed in Hawai‘i.73
In similar fashion, the Court analogized Hawai‘i’s reparative law to a Jim Crow
era “grandfather clause” that used ancestry to exclude African Americans from the
vote.74 In Guinn v. U.S.,75 the Court in 1915 invalidated an Oklahoma law that imposed
a literacy test as a voting qualification, but exempted individuals whose ancestors
65

See Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 63, at 545, 549.
See id. at 548. Among other things, OHA manages the income and proceeds from the
“Kingdom lands” (commonly known as “ceded lands”), Native Hawaiian Government and
Crown lands that were seized by the United States when it annexed Hawai‘i. See NATIVE
HAWAIIAN LAW: A TREATISE 79, 91 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie et al. eds., 2015).
When Hawai‘i became a state, the United States transferred those lands to the State to be held
in trust in part for the “betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians.” Id. at 32–33. Thus,
Hawai‘i law furthered Native Hawaiian self-governance by limiting those eligible to serve
as OHA trustees and to vote for OHA trustees to Hawaiians. Id. at 35. Hawaiians are defined
as “any descendant of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and
which peoples thereafter have continued to reside in Hawaii.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-2 (2013).
67
See Rice, 528 U.S. at 510.
68
Id. at 514.
69
See id. at 524.
70
Id. at 517 (noting that such ancestral “tracing” “demeans the dignity and worth of a person[,]” and is inconsistent with “respect based on the unique personality each of us possesses”).
71
Id. at 506.
72
Id.
73
See id.
74
See id. at 513–14 (citing Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915)).
75
238 U.S. 347 (1915).
66
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were entitled to vote prior to January 1, 1866—before the adoption of the Fifteenth
Amendment.76 In striking down the grandfather clause, the Court tried “in vain” to
find any reason for the law other than the systematic exclusion of African Americans.77 This, the Rice Court concluded, provided valuable guidance in assessing
Hawai‘i’s Native Hawaiian voting limitation.78
By characterizing Native Hawaiians as simply another racial group, and equating
Jim Crow racial exclusion to an effort to restore Native Hawaiian self-governance,
the Court effectively erased the unique status of Native Hawaiians, the harms of
U.S. colonization, and the present-day need to rectify those harms.79 Moreover, because Native Hawaiians are not members of a federally recognized tribe,80 and have
no special relationship with the federal government,81 laws singling them out are not
legally permissible political classifications.82 In this way, the Court “contract[ed] the
legal definition of indigeneity . . . implying that the only other way indigenous status
would carry legal significance under U.S. law would be as a racial designation.”83
Thus, for the Court, because the playing field was essentially leveled, the Native
Hawaiian voting system was simply an illegal “racial preference[ ]” for Hawaiians
and reverse racial discrimination against white American Freddy Rice.84
76

Guinn, 238 U.S. at 364–65 (“But no person who was, on January 1st, 1866, or at any
time prior thereto, entitled to vote under any form of government, or who at that time resided
in some foreign nation, and no lineal descendant of such person, shall be denied the right to
register and vote because of his inability to so read and write sections of such constitution.”).
77
Rice, 528 U.S. at 513 (citing Guinn, 238 U.S. at 364–65). The Guinn Court noted that the
law does not expressly exclude any person because of race, but “inherently brings that result
into existence since it is based purely upon a period of time before the enactment of the Fifteenth
Amendment and makes that period the controlling and dominant test of the right of suffrage.”
238 U.S. at 364–65. The Court concluded that it was “unable to discover how, unless the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment were considered, the slightest reason was afforded for
basing the classification upon a period of time prior to the Fifteenth Amendment.” Id. at 365.
78
See Rice, 528 U.S. at 513 (citing Guinn, 238 U.S. at 357).
79
See Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 63, at 560–61, 566.
80
See Rolnick, supra note 20, at 968 (citing Rice, 528 U.S. at 495).
81
See id. at 997.
82
See Rice, 528 U.S. at 518–20.
83
Rolnick, supra note 20, at 1000. Legal scholar Addie Rolnick observed that Rice solidified the political classification doctrine’s “oppositional framing,” which treats Native American
tribes “as political groups and ‘Indian’ as a political identity[,] . . . in opposition to racial
groups and racial identities.” Id. at 996. Rice therefore simultaneously discounted the role that
race played in the colonization of tribal Indians and sharply limited the legal definition of
“indigenous” to those who are members of federally recognized tribes. See id. at 996–97.
84
Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 63, at 566–67; Susan K. Serrano & Breann Swann
Nuuhiwa, Federal Indian Law: Implicit Bias Against Native Peoples as Sovereigns, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 217 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012).
The Court’s analysis is rooted in the narrow biological definition of race. This limited view
treats race as fixed, biologically determined and unconnected to culture, history, or social context.
See Susan Kiyomi Serrano, Comment, Rethinking Race for Strict Scrutiny Purposes: Yniguez
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Justice Stevens, in dissent, saw no similarity between voting systems “designed
to exclude one racial class (at least) from voting” and “a system designed to empower politically the remaining members of a class of once sovereign, indigenous
people.”85 The former, he contended, “recalls an age of abject discrimination against
an insular minority in the old South[,]”86 and the latter reflects a political “consensus
determined to recognize the special claim to self-determination of the indigenous
peoples of Hawaii.”87 Thus, for Justice Stevens, in light of Native Hawaiians’ right
to “compensation[,]” “self-determination[,]” and the “manifest purpose” of the Fifteenth Amendment, Hawai‘i’s reparative-justice voting scheme should be upheld.88
Rice opened the floodgates to other damaging lawsuits against Native Hawaiians
and Pacific Islanders.89 Using Rice as a starting point, non-Hawaiian plaintiffs successfully eliminated constitutional and statutory provisions requiring that Office of
Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) trustees be Native Hawaiian,90 challenged the allocation
of benefits for Native Hawaiians by the OHA and the Hawaiian Homes Commission,91
alleged that Native Hawaiians received “preferential treatment” under a variety of
state programs,92 challenged the real-property tax exemption granted to Native
Hawaiian homestead leases,93 and sued to dismantle the Kamehameha Schools’
admissions policy favoring Native Hawaiian children.94
The Rice case’s impact spread farther into the Pacific. In Davis v. Commonwealth
Election Commission,95 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals employed Rice to uphold
the district court’s decision to strike down a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands (CNMI) law restricting voting in certain elections to “persons of Northern
and the Racialization of English Only, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 221, 234–35 (1997) [hereinafter
Serrano, Rethinking Race]; see also Gotanda, supra note 51, at 4 (labeling this unconnected
notion of race as “formal-race”). But see Gotanda, supra note 51, at 32 (arguing that linking
racial categories to science erroneously suggests that race is a neutral, apolitical term, divorced
from social content); Serrano, Rethinking Race, supra, at 236 (observing that “dominant
paradigm of unalterable, biological race is inaccurate” because “it is based on false biological
assumptions that have no scientific basis . . . [and] fail[s] to take into account the ways that
race and racial categories are socially constructed”).
85
Rice, 528 U.S. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86
Id. at 546.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 528.
89
See Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 63, at 567–68.
90
See Arakaki v. Hawaii, 314 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
91
See Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2003).
92
Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d 1048, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007).
93
See Corboy v. Louie, 283 P.3d 695 (Haw. 2011).
94
See Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. dismissed, 550 U.S. 931 (2007). For a description of Rice and the cases that followed, see NATIVE
HAWAIIAN LAW: A TREATISE, supra note 66, at 284–303.
95
844 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the voting limitation is race-based and violates the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
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Marianas descent.”96 The law specified that only those of Northern Marianas descent
could vote on proposed constitutional amendments that govern restrictions on the
ownership of land, which is limited to Indigenous Chamorros and Carolinians.97 Such
voting limitations were put in place to protect CNMI’s ancestry-based land-alienation
provisions, which many fear are also at risk.98
By equating Indigenous reparative measures with invidious racial discrimination,
these challenges discount the history of colonization and its lasting consequences.
Along with Rice, these challenges form the backdrop for Davis v. Guam.
C. Davis v. Guam: Ancestry as Invidious Racial Purpose
In 2011, Arnold Davis, a white U.S. citizen and Guam resident, sued the Territory of Guam in federal district court, alleging that the territory unlawfully discriminated against him by prohibiting him from registering to vote in a political status
plebiscite reserved for “native inhabitant[s] of Guam.”99 Guam law directs Guam’s
Commission on Decolonization to “ascertain the intent of the Native Inhabitants of
Guam as to their future political relationship with the United States.”100 It also provides
for a future plebiscite in which “Native Inhabitants of Guam” would choose between
independence, free association with the United States, or statehood.101
The law defines native inhabitants as “those persons who became U.S. Citizens by
virtue of the authority and enactment of the 1950 Guam Organic Act and descendants of those persons.”102 The “native inhabitants” classification includes mostly
96

Id. at 1089–90. See also N. MAR. I. CONST. art. XII, § 4 (defining persons of Northern
Marianas descent as having at least some degree of “Northern Marianas Chamorro or Northern
Marianas Carolinian blood or a combination thereof” and deeming full-blooded those who
were “born or domiciled in the Northern Mariana Islands by 1950”). The Northern Marianas
Islands Constitution was amended in September 2013 to remove a provision requiring “at
least one-quarter Northern Marianas Chamorro or Northern Marianas Carolinian blood.” See
2013 N. Mar. I. H.L.I. 18-1.
97
See Davis, 844 F.3d at 1090.
98
See Brief for Intervenors or, in the Alternative, Amici Curiae the American Samoa
Government and Congressman Eni F.H. Faleomavaega at 27–28, Tuaua v. United States, 788
F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 13-5272). Importantly, the Covenant between the United States
and the CNMI restricts the acquisition of land to those of Northern Marianas descent in order
to preserve the people’s culture and traditions, and to promote their economic advancement
and self-sufficiency. See Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1990) (describing
the land alienation provision of the Covenant).
99
Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 7, at 1.
100
Davis v. Guam, 785 F.3d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 1 GUAM CODE ANN.
§ 2105 (2000)).
101
Id. (citing 1 GUAM CODE ANN. § 2110 (2000)).
102
3 GUAM CODE ANN. § 21001(e) (2000), amended by Guam Pub. L. No. 33-148 (2016).
A descendant is “a person who has proceeded by birth, such as a child or grandchild, to the
remotest degree, from any ‘Native Inhabitant of Guam,’ . . . and who is considered placed
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Indigenous Chamorros, but also includes multiracial and multi-ethnic populations who
were present in Guam in 1950.103 Guam is directed to conduct the plebiscite “if and
when 70 percent of all eligible Native Inhabitants register.”104 It would then transmit the
results of the plebiscite to the U.S. President, Congress, and the United Nations.105
Davis alleged that the law racially discriminated against him in violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Voting Rights Act, and the Organic Act of
Guam,106 because it “exclude[d] those without the preferred ancestors or racial bloodline
and bestow[ed] the right to vote effectively only on a favored race.”107 For Davis, any
reference to ancestry automatically implicated race and thereby violated the Fifteenth
Amendment; even if the classification “were not intended to, and did not have the effect
of, favoring a particular race,” it would violate the Fifteenth Amendment, “because
it uses ancestry or bloodlines.”108 He additionally argued that native inhabitants were
not a “political group” because “political groups are not defined by blood relationships.”109 Perhaps more importantly, Davis framed the case to appeal more broadly
to anti-affirmative action advocates by equating the “native inhabitants” classification
to the pernicious “one drop” rules of the post-Reconstruction U.S. South110:
[Guam] intended to create a set of voters deemed eligible to vote
by blood relations in the same way that other states decades ago
used blood relations to unconstitutionally deny the right to vote.
In those states, one drop of the wrong blood could disqualify a
citizen from voting; on Guam, one drop of the preferred blood
vests the right to vote. Both schemes are abhorrent to the Fifteenth Amendment.111
in a line of succession from such ancestor where such succession is by virtue of blood relations.”
3 GUAM CODE ANN. § 21001(c) (2000).
103
See Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 14, 21, Davis v. Guam,
2017 WL 930825 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017) (No. 11-00035) [hereinafter Opp. to Pl.’s Mot.
for Summ. J.].
104
Davis, 785 F.3d at 1313 (citing 1 GUAM CODE ANN. § 2110 (2000)).
105
1 GUAM CODE ANN. § 2105 (repealed/re-enacted by Pub. L. No. 25-106:10 (Mar. 24,
2000)).
106
Davis v. Guam, No. 11-00035, 2017 WL 930825, at *1–2 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017).
107
Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 5, at 7, 11 (contending that Guam’s reference to
descent violates the Fifteenth Amendment because it clearly “distinguish[es] among citizens
based on race”).
108
Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Davis v.
Guam, 2017 WL 930825 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017) (No. 11-00035).
109
Id. at 5. But see Rolnick, supra note 20, at 967–68 (contending that Native groups are
simultaneously racialized and have a special political relationship with the United States
government).
110
Reply in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Davis v. Guam,
2017 WL 930825 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017) (No. 11-00035).
111
Id.
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Guam framed the case as one rooted in broader conceptions of justice that
embrace Guam’s history and present-day colonization, the legitimacy of international law, and the United States’ obligation to rectify past wrongs.112 Guam argued
that, although the case is “styled as a reverse discrimination case, this lawsuit has
nothing to do with preventing race discrimination or safeguarding civil rights.”113
Instead, Guam contended, “[t]his case seeks to deny a multi-racial, multi-ethnic
group of people, namely, the pre-1950 residents of Guam and their descendants,
from effectively exercising their right to express by plebiscite their desires regarding
their future political relationship with the United States of America.”114 For Guam,
“[a]ttempting to disguise such an injustice beneath the cloak of civil rights is as
shameful as it is transparent.”115
Guam argued that the plebiscite law was instead a “temporal” classification that
depended only on whether a person received U.S. citizenship by way of Guam’s
1950 Organic Act.116 Rather than racial exclusion, the law’s purpose was to “implement the process of decolonization taken up in the first instance by Congress in
Guam’s Organic Act.”117 According to the Guam Legislature, the law’s intent was
to “permit the native inhabitants of Guam, as defined by the U.S. Congress’ 1950
Organic Act of Guam to exercise the inalienable right to self-determination of their
political relationship with the United States of America.”118
The district court initially framed the case as one involving “the topic of selfdetermination of the political status of the island[,]” but noticeably omitted any
analysis of Guam’s self-determination, colonial history, or modern-day attempts to
decolonize.119 Devoid of that larger context, the court held that “native inhabitants”
was a race-based classification120 and, therefore, Guam’s voting limitation violated
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.121 Citing heavily to Rice, Judge Frances
M. Tydingco-Gatewood proclaimed that Guam’s voting qualification was “a proxy
for race because it exclude[d] nearly all persons whose ancestors are not of a particular race.”122 While neutral on its face, Guam’s classification had a clear “racial
purpose”: it “treated the Chamorro people as ‘a distinct people.’”123
112

See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 7, at 7–8.
Id. at 1.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 8.
117
Id. at 11.
118
Id. (quoting 3 GUAM CODE ANN. § 21000 (2000)).
119
Davis v. Guam, No. 11-00035, 2017 WL 930825, at *1, *14 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017)
(acknowledging “the long history of colonization of this island and its people, and the desire
of those colonized to have their right to self-determination”).
120
Id. at *5.
121
See id. at *11, *14.
122
Id. at *6.
123
Id. at *8. For a more in-depth critique of the district court’s opinion, see infra Part III.
113
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On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Guam warned of the district court’s “dangerous
over-reading of Rice.”124 For Guam, Rice did not “invalidate[ ] a purely symbolic
expression of self-determination, by a federally created class of people, in an unincorporated territory, which, by definition, is ‘not destined for statehood,’ and not
bound in permanent union with the United States.”125 Moreover, Guam did not use
ancestry as a “cover” or a “pretext” for racial discrimination, but sought to further
the United States’ commitment to Guam’s decolonization.126 The plebiscite “classified people according to whether they or their ancestors were present on Guam on
the date the island was colonized by the United States . . . [and] in furtherance of
Congress’s self-proclaimed obligation under international law to facilitate the selfdetermination rights of a colonized people.”127
Davis contended that Guam “engaged in definitional games” and used “ancestral
tracing” as a substitute for race to “enforce a race-based voting restriction against
citizens of the United States.”128 According to Davis, the classification is both facially
race-based and infected with discriminatory intent: “The entire tenor of the debate”
surrounding the plebiscite law, alongside legislative discussions of related “Chamorroonly” laws, “confirms that the plebiscite law was widely understood to have been
enacted with the purpose of limiting the vote to Chamorro people.”129 With that
framing, Davis depicted Guam’s contemporary history as one in which “preferred”
Chamorros routinely attempted to create race-based privileges exclusively for themselves.130 As in Rice, by portraying Chamorros as simply another racial group, and
by discounting the history of U.S. imperialism and militarization in the region,131
Chamorros became “preferred” and “favored,” rather than an Indigenous group with
a unique need to rectify the damage of years of colonization.
The Ninth Circuit will soon decide whether Guam’s Decolonization Registry
Law unlawfully discriminates against white American Arnold Davis in violation of
the Fifteenth Amendment.132 If the court employs a formalist, ahistorical lens, and
124

Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 17, Davis v. Guam (No. 17-15719) (Aug. 31,
2017) [hereinafter Opening Br. of Defs.-Appellants].
125
Id. at 1 (citation omitted).
126
Id. at 11.
127
Id. at 1.
128
Response Brief for Appellee at 1, Davis v. Guam, No. 17-15719 (9th Cir. Nov. 21,
2017) [hereinafter Resp. Br. for Appellee].
129
Id. at 36–37. See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Plaintiff-Appellee and Urging Affirmance at 10–16, Davis v. Guam, No. 17-15719 (9th Cir.
Nov. 28, 2017) (arguing, among other things, that Guam’s decolonization law uses ancestry
as a proxy for race, and thereby intentionally discriminates based on race in violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment).
130
See Resp. Br. for Appellee, supra note 128, at 8.
131
Id. at 1; see also id. at 33.
132
The Ninth Circuit’s oral argument was held on October 10, 2018. While both Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims are on appeal, this Article addresses primarily the
Fifteenth Amendment claim.
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determines that ancestry is always a proxy for race, then Guam’s Decolonization
Registry Law and many other remedial statutes meant to remedy the harms of U.S.
colonization will be struck down. But Rice did not hold that ancestry is always a
proxy for race. For this reason, it is crucial to explore the appropriate approach for
determining whether, and under what circumstances, an ancestral classification
would become a racial one. As explained below, the court should embrace a more
contextual approach, consistent with the relevant case law, that recognizes that
reference to ancestry or descent does not convert a classification into a race-based
one, particularly when the initiative aims to remedy the harms of U.S. colonization.
II. A REPARATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH TO REMEDYING THE
HARMS OF COLONIZATION
In its modern interpretation of Reconstruction-era civil-rights laws, the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined “racial discrimination” as “that which singles out ‘identifiable classes of persons . . . solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.’”133
From this view, race refers only to ancestry or skin color, and has no political or
social meaning;134 mere recognition of descent is instantly suspect.135 But as critical
sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant recognize, race—based in part on
ancestry—is continually created, shaped, and transformed by social and political
forces, “thereby imparting [positive or negative] racial meaning to groups, social
practices and events.”136 This racialization process is key to colonization’s function.137 Scholars worldwide recognize that colonizing forces exert control over land
and resources, and legitimate that power, in part by disparaging Native peoples.138 That
vilification—characterizing colonized peoples as inferior and unworthy—takes
many forms, including negative cultural imagery about the group and its ancestry.139
133

Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 515 (2000) (quoting Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji,
481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987)). See also id. at 517 (“Distinctions between citizens solely because of
their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon
the doctrine of equality.” (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943))).
134
See id. at 515.
135
See Rolnick, supra note 20, at 1001–02.
136
Serrano, Collective Memory, supra note 31, at 365–66 (quoting OMI & WINANT,
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 55–56 (2d ed.
1994)). From this view, race is socially constructed, value-laden, and changeable, and racial
categories carry social and political significance and serve to legitimize the unequal allocation
of resources. See OMI & WINANT, supra, at 55 (defining race as an “unstable and ‘decentered’
complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle”); Ian F.
Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,
and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994) (describing race as socially fabricated
by humans rather than created by natural differentiation).
137
Serrano, Collective Memory, supra note 31, at 368.
138
See MEMMI, RACISM, supra note 30, at 170–77.
139
See id. at 190; Serrano, Collective Memory, supra note 31, at 368–69.

2018]

ASSESSING ANCESTRAL CLASSIFICATIONS

519

The restorative justice approach to remedying those material and cultural harms of
colonization, therefore, must take into account that ancestry.
A. Ancestry and Race as Key to Colonization
International scholar Albert Memmi, “a Tunisian Jew and resister of French
colonialism,”140 incisively describes how race and ancestry are deployed to justify
colonization or political “aggression.”141 Because the colonizer portrays itself as “civilized and law-abiding,”142 it needs a mechanism for justifying to its people and the
world its bald political takeover of another country and its people.143 That mechanism is racism.144 Memmi defines racism as “the generalized and final assigning of
values to real or imaginary differences, to the accuser’s benefit and at his victim’s
expense, in order to justify the former’s own privileges or aggression.”145 “For Memmi,
[then,] ‘racism’ . . . is not simple ignorance or skin color prejudice. Rather, [it involves
the process of] characterizing people as ‘different,’ less-worthy, or less-human ‘others’
(threatening, uncivilized, inferior)”—often rooted in that groups’ ancestry—“to make
political ‘aggression’ [against the entire group] for economic or military reasons appear necessary.”146
140

Serrano, Collective Memory, supra note 31, at 368.
See ALBERT MEMMI, DOMINATED MAN 186–95 (1968) [hereinafter MEMMI, DOMINATED MAN].
142
JACL–Hawai‘i Amicus Br., supra note 35, at 13.
143
MEMMI, DOMINATED MAN, supra note 141, at 186; ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER
AND THE COLONIZED 69–76 (Howard Greenfield trans., Orion Press 1965) (1957) [hereinafter
MEMMI, COLONIZER]. See also Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal
Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 261–77 (1989) (describing Memmi’s framework in the context of the colonization of Native Americans).
144
See MEMMI, RACISM, supra note 30, at 179.
145
Id. at 169.
146
Serrano et al., Restorative Justice for Hawai‘i’s First People, supra note 35, at 217 (citing
amicus brief employing Memmi’s framework). See also Juan F. Perea, Fulfilling Manifest
Destiny: Conquest, Race, and the Insular Cases, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO
RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 140 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke
Marshall eds., 2001) (applying Memmi’s insights to the U.S. conquest of Puerto Rico); Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free
Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1259–60 (1992) (describing negative historical depictions of the major groups of color in the United States);
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1370 (1988) (contending that “the
subordination of Blacks was rationalized by a series of stereotypes and beliefs that made their
conditions appear logical and natural”); Williams, supra note 143, at 261–78 (employing
Memmi’s framework to analyze white society’s aggression against Indian tribes).
141
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Memmi describes four steps, or discursive strategies, used by European-derived
cultures to justify the colonization of non-white races:
(1) [s]tressing the real or imaginary differences between the racist
and his victim[;] (2) [a]ssigning values to those differences, to
the advantage of the racist and the detriment of his victim[;] (3)
[t]rying to make them absolutes by generalizing from them and
claiming that they are final[;] [and] (4) [j]ustifying any present
or possible aggression or privilege.147
In other words, the colonizer underscores the real or imaginary biological or cultural
differences between the accuser and victim “to intensify or cause . . . exclusion,” and
to place the victim outside of the polity, “or even outside humanity.”148 For example,
“for Whites, the color and physical characteristics of Black people, which are made
to signify a biological inferiority, constitute the very authorization to preside over
them.”149
As Memmi recognizes, biological differences, for the colonizer, are points of
departure.150 The colonizer places a value on those differences that automatically
proves the inferiority of non-white peoples, and the concomitant superiority of
whites.151 Thus, the colonizer “ascribes to [its] victim a series of surprising traits,
calling him incomprehensible, impenetrable, mysterious, strange, [and] disturbing.”152
The colonizer totalizes those differences “until all of the victim’s personality is
characterized by the difference, and all of the members of [its] social group are targets
for the accusation.”153 It then makes those differences absolute through time: no change
is possible because the inferior races have always been and will always be this way.154
147

MEMMI, DOMINATED MAN, supra note 141, at 186 (emphasis removed). See also MEMMI,
COLONIZER, supra note 143, at 69–76 (describing the colonizer’s use of racism); Williams,
supra note 143, at 265 (“[T]he strategic use of difference to intensify the separation of
peoples of color unites the colonizing discourses deployed by Europeans in all the lands they
have invaded and conquered.”); EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 9 (1994)
(“[Colonialism and imperialism] are supported and perhaps even impelled by impressive
ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and
beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination.”).
148
MEMMI, RACISM, supra note 30, at 171 (noting that “[t]he colonizer discriminates to
demonstrate the impossibility of including the colonized in the community: because he would
be too biologically or culturally different, technically or politically inept, etc.”).
149
Id. at 190.
150
Id.
151
See id. at 173.
152
Id. at 176.
153
Id. at 174.
154
See id. at 176. See also Johnson v. M‘Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (Marshall, C.J.) (denying Native American claims to first-in-time title to land on racial grounds); ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE
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Finally, using these negative characterizations, the colonizer justifies permanent aggression and colonial exploitation: the colonized deserves what he receives;155 at the
same time, the colonizer is relieved of responsibility.156 In sum, “[u]nderneath its masks,
racism is the racist’s way of giving himself absolution.”157
Thus, racism—based on cultural representations in part tied to ancestry—
appears “not as an incidental detail, but as a consubstantial part of colonialism. It is
the highest expression of the colonial system and one of the most significant features
of the colonialist.”158 And this significant feature persists over time; “[n]ot only does
[racism] establish a fundamental discrimination between colonizer and colonized,
a sine qua non of colonial life, but it also lays the foundation for the immutability
of this life.”159
As described below, at the turn of the twentieth century, U.S. leaders described
Chamorros as ignorant, childlike, easily controlled, immature, simple, and primitive.160
These negative racialized characterizations served to justify U.S. colonial rule,161 the
confiscation of land,162 de jure segregation,163 and the outlawing of Chamorro cultural
practices,164 causing long-lasting negative impacts on Chamorros. As a result, in the
1950 Organic Act of Guam, Congress acknowledged its international obligations to restore to Guam’s native inhabitants a measure of self-determination, while acknowledging that “the ultimate expression of self-determination had yet to occur.”165
Recognizing this congressional commitment, Guam’s decolonization law seeks to
facilitate the exercise of native inhabitants’ “inalienable right to self-determination.”166
LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 47 (2005) (describing the Founding Fathers’ view
of Indian tribes as uncivilized and savage, as part of “a long established language of racism
in America”); Rolnick, supra note 20, at 992 (asserting that the United States’ relationship
with Indian tribes “was shaped by a racialized assumption of Indian savagery”).
155
See MEMMI, RACISM, supra note 30, at 178–79.
156
See id. at 179.
157
Id. at 180. See also FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS 69 (Charles Lam
Markmann trans., Pluto Books 1967) (1952) (“The feeling of inferiority of the colonized is the
correlative to the European’s feeling of superiority. Let us have the courage to say it outright:
It is the racist who creates his inferior.”); Jean-Paul Sartre, Introduction, in MEMMI, COLONIZER,
supra note 143, at xxvi (explaining that the colonizer dehumanizes the colonized to exalt or
exonerate himself).
158
MEMMI, COLONIZER supra note 143, at 74.
159
Id.
160
See infra notes 219–30 and accompanying text.
161
See infra notes 219–30 and accompanying text.
162
See infra notes 219–30 and accompanying text.
163
See infra notes 219–30 and accompanying text.
164
See infra notes 231–55 and accompanying text; accord Rolnick, supra note 20, at 967
(observing that, similarly, “Indian racialization has drawn on ideas about culture, religion,
savagery, skin color, and ancestry to justify an unequal distribution of power, land, and rights”).
165
Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 103, at 17.
166
3 GUAM CODE ANN. § 21000 (2000), amended by Guam Pub. L. No. 33-148 (2016).
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B. Reparative Justice Informed by Principles of Self-Determination
Meaningful decolonization thus “entails repairing the harms suffered by those
who have experienced systemic oppression according to their self-shaped notions
of reparation.”167 This type of repair, or “reparative justice,” focuses on mending
breaches in the polity by healing the persisting wounds of communities harmed.168
Its goal is to ascertain and respond to groups’ self-determined ideas of injury and
remedy in order to build new relationships “as focal points for fostering an interestconvergence among the victims of injustice . . . and society itself.”169 As legal
scholar Eric Yamamoto asserts, “[b]ecause the wounds are the material and psychological harms of injustice, the prescriptions for healing those wounds must be informed by justice[,]” shaped by both those harmed and the larger society.170 Similarly,
legal scholar Martha Minow contends that reparative justice for victims of mass
violence should embody the notion of restorative justice “to repair the harms and to
institute future changes to correct the injustice.”171 For Indigenous legal scholar
Rebecca Tsosie, “self-determination provides the baseline requirement for an effective theory of reparative justice.”172
Reparative justice, informed by principles of self-determination, thus requires
us to pay close attention to the proactive-justice claims of those harmed by the
injustice. Legal scholar Carleton Waterhouse maintains that effective reparative-justice
efforts should focus on victims’ material needs and well-being,173 and offer those
victims a central role in the design and implementation of schemes to repair harms
to their political autonomy.174 This kind of “[d]eference to victims respects their
rights to personhood and self-determination.”175 In the context of U.S. colonization,
167

Susan K. Serrano, Elevating the Perspectives of U.S. Territorial Peoples: Why the Insular
Cases Should Be Taught in Law School, 21 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 11 (forthcoming 2018)
[hereinafter Serrano, Elevating the Perspectives]. See also Tsosie, supra note 27, at 245.
168
See Yamamoto et al., supra note 27, at 16.
169
Id. at 4.
170
Id. at 39. See also Eric K. Yamamoto, Miyoko Pettit-Toledo & Sarah Sheffield, Bridging
the Chasm: Reconciliation’s Needed Implementation Fourth Step, 15 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST.
109, 145 n.159 (2016) (noting that “[r]eparative justice is deeply rooted in international human
rights norms that not only seek to prevent gross violations but also to repair the damage
already inflicted”).
171
Tsosie, supra note 27, at 249 (citing MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 91–117 (1998)).
172
Id. at 253. See also D. Kapua‘ala Sproat, Wai Through KƗnƗwai: Water for Hawai‘i’s
Streams and Justice for Hawaiian Communities, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 127, 172 (2011) (noting
that “a restorative justice approach informed by principles of self-determination” is “particularly apt in light of the ravages of colonization”).
173
See Waterhouse, supra note 27, at 268.
174
See id. at 267–70.
175
Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
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the damage to a people’s self-determination should similarly be repaired according
to the colonized peoples’ sense of what is needed.
Thus, reparative justice for U.S. territorial peoples may entail repairing longstanding imbalances of power and agency, and redressing multiple political, economic,
cultural, and social harms.176 For Indigenous inhabitants of the territories, in particular,
the preservation of their deep connections to land (and where applicable, the return of
land), the reclaiming of knowledge systems, language, and life ways, and the regeneration of self-government, are also central to their self-determination.177 As Tsosie notes,
reparative justice for Indigenous peoples “ought to engage Native normative frameworks of justice because, for Native peoples, reparative justice is a process that is
simultaneously emotional and spiritual, political and social.”178 As she observes,
however, no single theory of reparative justice “can fit all cultures, all nations, and
all peoples.”179 Instead, “the theory will differ depending on the particular historical
context and cultural framework that applies.”180
Given this reality, and because ancestry was integral to U.S. colonialism,181
Chamorro “political efforts to rectify the devastation of [that] colonization must
address . . . ancestry as part of the restoration process.”182 Justice Stevens expressly
acknowledged the import of this analysis in assessing Native Hawaiian programs:
principles of self-determination and “compensat[ion] for past wrongs” require considering Indigenous ancestry.183 Employing such an inquiry ensures an appropriate
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 387, 397 (1987) (contending that redress should always look “to
victims for guidance”).
176
See, e.g., Pedro A. Malavet, Reparations Theory and Postcolonial Puerto Rico: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 387, 391 (2002) (employing a “repair” paradigm
to envision ways to construct “local political power for Puerto Ricans, and to create a viable
Puerto Rican economy that supports real equal opportunity . . . thus repairing the legacy of
political, economic, and psychological colonization by the United States”); Ediberto Roman,
Reparations and the Colonial Dilemma: The Insurmountable Hurdles and Yet Transformative Benefits, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 369, 384 (2002) (suggesting that a transformative
reparations effort for the people of the U.S. territories should first focus on exposure and
acknowledgment of the wrongs committed, and should “use the commonalities of wrongs
to coalesce and form formidable political efforts” in a continuing effort to support territorial
peoples’ human rights).
177
See Camacho, supra note 61, at 700 (“Construed as cultural, economic, or spiritual connections to land, Chamorro proponents of indigenous rights discourses have long contested
[American multiculturalism] in favor of Chamorro-centered modes of identity, nationhood, and
politics.”); Tsosie, supra note 27, at 236 (noting that the “[r]epatriation of land is central to Indigenous self-determination, and is fundamentally linked to the political and cultural sovereignty
of Indigenous peoples”).
178
Tsosie, supra note 27, at 253 (interior quotes omitted).
179
Id.
180
Id. at 253–54.
181
See Serrano et al., Restorative Justice for Hawai‘i’s First People, supra note 35, at 221.
182
JACL–Hawai`i Amicus Br., supra note 35, at 13.
183
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 528, 533–35 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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nexus between the historical harm and the present-day remedy. To do otherwise
would foreclose modern-day recognition of that group’s historically rooted selfdetermination rights.184
In the context of repair for harms of colonization, courts should therefore conduct
a “context-specific inquiry”185 to determine whether the ancestral classification serves
to remedy the damage of colonization.186 As Justice Stevens recognized, the U.S. Supreme Court has historically viewed voting laws designed to exclude a racial group
“through a specialized lens—a lens honed in specific detail to reveal the realities of
time, place, and history behind the voting restrictions being tested.”187 Implicit in
Justice Stevens’s statement is that all ancestral classifications must also be viewed
through a specialized—or contextual—lens. Thus, in assessing a colonized group’s
attempts to restore a measure of self-governance through a political status plebiscite,
a court’s inquiry into the program’s so-called “racial definition” and “racial purpose”
“must incorporate the context of colonization and its resulting devastation of the Native
people.”188 In other words, in examining Guam’s attempts to facilitate Congress’s
self-proclaimed international law obligation to advance native inhabitants’ selfdetermination, the Ninth Circuit should not tightly limit its inquiry, as the district
court did, to “whether a challenged program effectively excludes other groups.”189
Instead, the court must ask if the plebiscite’s use of ancestry is crafted as a restorative response to colonialism’s devastation.190
That very inquiry is the jurisprudential foundation of Morton v. Mancari,191 in
which the U.S. Supreme Court found a preference for Native American ancestry in
Bureau of Indian Affairs employment decisions to be a “political” restorative measure
and therefore legitimate, even though race was involved.192 The fact that the Indigenous
184

Opening Br. of Defs.-Appellants, supra note 124, at 2.
Id. at 17.
186
See id.
187
Rice, 528 U.S. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347, 355 (1915) (expressly considering the history of discrimination against African Americans
in Oklahoma in its decision to strike down Oklahoma’s racially exclusionary grandfather clause).
188
JACL–Hawai‘i Amicus Br., supra note 35, at 219. See also Rice, 528 U.S. at 545
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Anaya, supra note 35, at 15.
189
JACL–Hawai‘i Amicus Br., supra note 35, at 220.
190
This approach is equally apt for analyzing Davis’s Equal Protection claim. For the same
reasons, when assessing a colonized group’s attempts to restore a measure of self-governance,
the court should ask if the law’s use of race or ancestry is compelling in that it does not vilify
other racial groups (treating them as racially inferior or uncivilized) and, most importantly,
is crafted as a restorative response to colonialism’s devastation.
191
417 U.S. 535 (1974).
192
See id. at 553 n.24; see also Carole Goldberg, What’s Race Got to Do With It?: The
Story of Morton v. Mancari, in RACE LAW STORIES 237, 241 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne
Carbado eds., 2008) (observing that the Indian Reorganization Act expressly included blood
quantum requirements).
185
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hiring practice excluded other racial groups was not determinative.193 Indeed, ancestry had to be an integral factor in the political restoration process because ancestry
“had been key originally in the United States’s justification for the confiscation of
land,”194 “the creation of guardian-ward reservations,”195 and the destruction of
culture and self-governance (the savage and uncivilized Natives had to be conquered
and then watched over).196
That analysis also found support in the jurisprudential underpinnings of Wabol
v. Villacrusis.197 There, the Ninth Circuit held that ancestry-based restrictions on
certain acquisitions of land in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
were “race-based” but were nevertheless lawful restorative measures to promote the
economic advancement and self-sufficiency of formerly colonized peoples.198 For
the court, interposing the Equal Protection Clause in that context would be impractical and anomalous because it would lead to “the loss of [Native] land, [and the
Native People’s] cultural and social identity,” and “force the United States to break
its pledge to preserve and protect NMI culture and property.”199
193

See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 544 n.17, 545, 553–54 (acknowledging that the Indian “preference” would disadvantage non-Indian applicants).
194
JACL–Hawai‘i Amicus Br., supra note 35, at 220–21.
195
Id.
196
See Johnson v. M‘Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823) (justifying the confiscation of Native
American land because “the character and religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for
considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an
ascendency”); DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
103 (5th ed. 2005) (asserting that race was the justification by which American Indians were
deemed “incapable of . . . assimilation” and a “challenge to white [civilized] society”); Bethany
R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 598 (2009) (tracing
the use of racism to shape U.S. Indian policy and concluding that throughout the various eras,
“tribes [were] reinscribed as inferior, limited, and defined by their race to justify limiting tribal
independence and controlling Indian people”); Rolnick, supra note 20, at 1026 (contending
that “[e]very aspect of the Indian political relationship has been shaped by a racialized
definition of Indians, from the trust relationship to the recognition of separate jurisdiction to
the question of which groups qualify as Indian tribes”); Williams, supra note 143, at 262,
277 (describing the United States’ use of racism to justify domination of Indians); see also
Harris, supra note 60, at 1715 (describing how race was used to justify U.S. conquest of Indians
and slavery of African Americans).
197
958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990).
198
See id. at 1451–52 (explaining that the purpose of section 805 of the Covenant to
Establish a Commonwealth in Political Union with the United States of America was “‘to
protect [the people] against exploitation and to promote their economic advancement and
self-sufficiency’ and to preserve the islanders’ culture and traditions, which are uniquely tied
to the land”) (alteration in original).
199
Id. at 1462 (determining that equal access to race-based land ownership was not a
fundamental right in CNMI). The court declared that “[t]he Bill of Rights was not intended to
interfere with the performance of our international obligations. Nor was it intended to operate
as a genocide pact for diverse native cultures.” Id. See also Craddick v. Territorial Registrar
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Importantly, a law based on this deeply reparative justice approach does not
seek to vilify, stereotype, or exclude based on race. 200 It is not a pretext or “cover”
for invidious racial discrimination.201 Unlike the white-imposed ancestry-based voting
law in Guinn v. U.S., which served only to exclude African Americans,202 a law that
has at its core the restoration of self-determination for a colonized people is not converted into one that merely aims to benefit one racial group over another.203 Instead,
such a reparative law is based on the notion that ancestry served to justify the colonial
exploitation and differential treatment of Native peoples.204 A Native group’s use of
ancestry—as part of a restorative response to colonialism’s devastation—therefore
appropriately connects that harm and the needed remedy.
of Am. Sam., 1 A.S.R.2d 10, 14 (Am. Sam. App. Div. 1980), available at http://www.asbar
.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=641:1asr2d10&catid=50&Itemid
=254 [https://perma.cc/PG8L-G2XC] (holding that the preservation of American Samoan
culture constituted a compelling interest to uphold ancestry-based land alienation, and noting
that the U.S. government has consistently acknowledged the importance of such restrictions);
Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race Versus Political Identity
Dilemma, 96 CAL. L. REV. 801, 806 (2008) (analyzing Wabol and Craddick to articulate a
“retheorization of equal protection law that would make it more accommodating of measures
designed to facilitate the self-determination rights of all indigenous peoples in the United
States” by “expanding the law’s interpretation of the meaning of political indigeneity”). Villazor
recommends a closer analysis of U.S. territorial blood quantum land laws, “considering in
particular their colonial origins and how the property laws promote the indigenous peoples’
right of self-determination.” Id. at 824. In light of past and present colonialism in the territories, “these land laws facilitate a measure of political control over the indigenous peoples’
social, economic and cultural developments” and therefore should “be held to promote a political
and not racial purpose.” Id. My approach shares some aspects of Villazor’s “political indigeneity” framework, particularly her emphasis on the history of colonization and Indigenous
self-determination; but rather than seeking to expand the meaning of “political,” I explore a reparative approach that takes account of ancestry.
200
See Opening Br. of Defs.-Appellants, supra note 124, at 11.
201
Id.
202
See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364–65 (1915).
203
See Opening Br. of Defs.-Appellants, supra note 124, at 16–17, 22.
204
See MEMMI, RACISM, supra note 30, at 190–91. Rolnick articulates a theoretical
framework that acknowledges that “Indianness” is both racial and political: Indians belong
to a group that has been racialized and that has a political and historical relationship with the
United States. Rolnick, supra note 20, at 967, 1026. Her framework embraces Mancari’s
“political classification” principle, but advances a conceptual reframing of both racial Indianness
(as more than simple skin color or ancestry) and political Indianness (as more than simply
a matter of civil participation). See id. at 967, 1028. Her approach uncovers the “cyclical
relationship between Indian racialization and Indian political status[,]” and “facilitates
consideration of how tribal political rights counteract anti-Indian racism.” Id. at 967–68. My
framework shares some aspects of Rolnick’s approach, particularly her examination of the
deep connections between race and indigeneity, but instead of inquiring into the politicalclassification doctrine, I examine a reparative approach—in the context of non-tribal Native
peoples—to remedying the harms of colonization by taking account of ancestry.
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III. A REPARATIVE JUSTICE ANALYSIS OF DAVIS V. GUAM
This “specialized” analysis is starkly missing, however, from the district court’s
constricted “ancestry as proxy for race” approach in Davis.205 To uncover Guam’s socalled “invidious discriminatory purpose,” the district court employed a narrow “historical background” inquiry that focused tightly on the events leading up to the law’s
passage,206 but ignored the historical injuries the law sought to remedy.207 In the absence
of that historical context, the court simply combed the committee reports of related laws
and bills for any mention of ancestry as an indicator of invidiousness.208 In a bill about
voter registration and educational campaign programs, for example, the Guam Legislature referred to “‘Chamorro’ self-determination.”209 In a round table meeting regarding another bill that did not become law, a legislator expressed her desire that the
plebiscite vote be limited to Chamorros as a measure of their self-determination.210
The court also noted that the “Native Inhabitants” definition was “nearly identical” to
the “Native Chamorro” definition in the Chamorro Land Trust Act.211 Thus, according
to the court, because Guam “used ancestry as a racial definition and for a racial purpose[,]”212 Guam’s voting restriction violated Davis’s Fifteenth Amendment rights.213
Both Davis and the district court ignored the “historical background” of the law itself; that it was enacted as a restorative response to U.S. colonization.214 That colonization was carried out using race and ancestry to destabilize and dehumanize the
Chamorro people as a means of control.215 Indeed, the United States deployed all four
205

Davis v. Guam, No. 11-00035, 2017 WL 930825, at *4 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017).
Id. at *4, *7–8. See also Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266–67 (1977) (noting that, in determining whether “invidious discriminatory purpose
was a motivating factor” in a governmental decision, the court may consider “[t]he historical
background of the decision . . . particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for
invidious purposes[,]” and “[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision[,]” among other things).
207
See Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 11–13, Davis v. Guam No. 17-15719
(Dec. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Reply Br. of Defs.-Appellants].
208
See Davis, 2017 WL 930825, at 7–11.
209
Id. at 1. According to that bill, “the registration method and educational campaign programs for the Plebiscite were to be developed in consultation with the ‘Commission on
Decolonization for the Implementation and Exercise of Chamorro Self Determination.’” Id.
(quoting Guam Pub. L. No. 31-92 (May 20, 2011)).
210
See id. at 9 (referring to Defendants’ argument which utilized then-Senator Tina Mura
Banes’s statements to support their claim that the plain meaning of a statute wins over statements of “individual lawmakers”).
211
Id. at 10. See 21 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 75101–75117 (2000).
212
Davis, 2017 WL 930825 at 8.
213
The court also held that the plebiscite law violated Davis’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.
See id. at 14.
214
See Reply Br. of Defs.-Appellants, supra note 207, at 11–13.
215
See Julian Go, “Racism” and Colonialism: Meanings of Difference and Ruling Practices in America’s Pacific Empire, 27 QUAL. SOC. 35, 41–44 (2004).
206
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of Memmi’s discursive strategies to justify the colonization of the Chamorro
people.216 After the United States acquired Guam by Spanish cession in 1898
following the Spanish-American War,217 the U.S. Navy took total control over the
island and governed it for fifty years.218 To the newly established U.S. government
in Guam, the Chamorro people were “poor, ignorant, very dirty in their habits, but
gentle and very religious . . . . They [were] like children, easily controlled and
readily influenced by example, good and bad . . . .”219 U.S. naval officials viewed
them as “lazy,”220 “immature,”221 and “‘incapable’ of governing themselves.”222 At the
same time, they were “a happy, careless people,”223 who possessed no “ambition or the
desire for change or progress.”224 A naval governor of Guam similarly called them
216

About 4,000 years ago, the ancestors of the Chamorro people arrived in the Marianas
Islands. See Tiana R. Na‘puti & Michael Lujan Bevacqua, Militarization and Resistance from
Guåhan: Protecting and Defending Pågat, 67 AM. Q. 837, 842 (2015). A matriarchal society,
the Chamorro people are deeply connected to their ancestors, “for they believe their spirits,
I taotaomo’na, are omnipresent in the air, land, ocean and all dimensions of life.” LisaLinda
Natividad & Victoria-Lola Leon Guerrero, The Explosive Growth of U.S. Military Power on
Guam Confronts People Power: Experience of an Island People under Spanish, Japanese and
American Colonial Rule, 8 ASIA-PAC. J. 1, 3 (2010). Colonization and dispossession for over
400 years under Spain, Japan, and the United States hastened the near-demise of Chamorros,
resulting in the loss of cultural practices, traditions, and language, and the manifestation of
unresolved trauma. See Julian Aguon, Comment, Other Arms: The Power of a Dual Rights
Legal Strategy for the Chamoru People of Guam Using the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples in U.S. Courts, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 113, 126–27 (2008) [hereinafter Aguon,
Other Arms]; Natividad & Guerrero, supra, at 3; Jon M. Van Dyke et al., Self-Determination
for Nonself-Governing Peoples and for Indigenous Peoples: The Cases of Guam and Hawai‘i,
18 U. HAW. L. REV. 623, 625 (1996).
217
See Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, art. I–III, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, 1755–56 (concluding the Spanish-American War and ceding Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam, and the Philippines
to the United States).
218
See ROBERT F. ROGERS, DESTINY’S LANDFALL: A HISTORY OF GUAM 224 (1995);
Anthony (T.J.) F. Quan, “Respeta I Taotao Tano”: The Recognition and Establishment of the
Self-Determination and Sovereign Rights of the Indigenous Chamorros of Guam Under International, Federal, and Local Law, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 3, 70 (2002).
219
Laurel Anne Monnig, “Proving Chamorro”: Indigenous Narratives of Race, Identity,
and Decolonization on Guam 83 (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois
at Urbana–Champaign) (on file with author) (quoting the 1904 comments of U.S. Commander
and Naval Governor G.L. Dyer). See also Go, supra note 215, at 43 (describing Governor
Dyer in 1904 as stating that Chamorro people “lead lives of Arcadian simplicity and freedom
from ambition or desire for change or progress”).
220
Go, supra note 215, at 41 (describing the second governor of Guam Seaton Schroeder’s
proclamation that “the Chamorros showed certain ‘vices’ such as ‘laziness,’ but he stressed
that this was due to the remote and isolated context in which the Chamorros lived”).
221
Monnig, supra note 219, at 92.
222
Id.
223
Go, supra note 215, at 42.
224
ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED
STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 319 (1989).
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“ideally simple and childlike”225 and “happy and contented”226 because of their remoteness from “time [and] modernity.”227 President McKinley commanded that the
U.S. Navy’s “mission, with respect to the Chamorro, [be] one of ‘benevolent assimilation.’”228 This approach treated Chamorros as “diseased . . . primitive, . . . illiterate, . . .
amoral,”229 and “sick . . . condition[s] that required modern, Western intervention
to survive.”230
Based on these value-laden and racialized representations, the United States easily
controlled the population for its own economic, political, and military advantage.231
The United States confiscated Chamorro homelands,232 converted Guam into a
strategic military outpost,233 and destabilized Chamorro culture and language in an
effort to “civiliz[e]” and “Americaniz[e]” Chamorros for U.S. military gain.234 Indeed,
according to a naval governor of Guam, “colonial governance should attend to the
225

Go, supra note 215, at 46 (describing Governor Schroder’s characterization of the
Chamorros). See also id. at 54 (quoting the Governor of Guam in 1905 as declaring, “[t]his is
purely an agricultural community. It would be of doubtful advantage to attempt to educate them
in subjects likely to induce feelings of restlessness and dissatisfaction with their simple lives”).
226
Id. at 51.
227
Id. (“Isolated from time, modernity, and corrupt foreign influences, the Chamorros and
Samoans were already happy and contented . . . .”). In this way, Chamorros were often
romanticized by U.S. decision-makers. See id. at 42 (reporting that Guam’s Naval governor
in 1904 “asserted that while the Chamorros were sometimes lazy, they were at the same time
a ‘peaceful, good-natured, law-abiding people, industrious in their own way’”).
228
Jonathan Fanning, “We Flow Like Water”: Contemporary Livelihoods and the Partitioning of the Self Among the Chamorro of Guam 16 (Spring 2015) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
Colorado State University) (on file with author), available at https://mountainscholar.org/bit
stream/handle/10217/167041/Fanning_colostate_0053N_13009.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed
=y. See also Anne Perez Hattori, Colonial Dis-Ease: U.S. Navy Health Policies and the
Chamorros of Guam, 1898–1941 159 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Hawai‘i) (observing that a key part of the United States’ colonial mission was the “rehabilitation of the Chamorro race” to serve the interests of the Naval government).
229
See Hattori, supra note 228, at 72 (explaining that naval policies viewed American
personnel on Guam as the binary opposite: healthy, modern, literate, and moral).
230
Fanning, supra note 228, at 16.
231
See Go, supra note 215, at 52 (quoting the Governor of Guam in 1904 as declaring that
the political system in Guam was “appropriate and practical, ‘thanks to the docile temperament
of a gentle people, their respect for law and order and their confidence in the integrity of the
officers . . . appointed to care for them and their welfare’”).
232
See Michael P. Perez, Pacific Identities Beyond US Racial Formations: The Case of
Chamorro Ambivalence and Flux, 8 SOC. IDENTITIES 457, 459 (2002) [hereinafter Perez, Pacific
Identities] (discussing the U.S. acquisition of Chomorro ancestral land during and after World
War II).
233
See Na‘puti & Bevacqua, supra note 216, at 843.
234
See Hattori, supra note 228, at 78–81 (maintaining that Americanization programs on
Guam “ultimately served the interests of the military” by protecting the health of the personnel
and validating their colonial presence while positioning them as the rescuers of an underprivileged race).
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‘welfare’ of the Chamorros, but only because the natives’ welfare in turn secured the
welfare of the navy base.”235 Thus, the United States simultaneously sought to “civilize”
Chamorros, but denied them U.S. citizenship,236 civil rights and liberties,237 and the
ability to participate in the government that controlled them.238
More broadly, the United States used race and ancestry to justify its conquest and
subordination of territorial peoples throughout its newly expanded empire.239 The
U.S. government viewed territorial peoples as “alien,”240 “ignorant,”241 and “semicivilized.”242 The territories were viewed as “far off, not contiguous to the continent,
densely populated, unamenable to colonization by settlement on the part of AngloAmericans, and, above all, inhabited by alien peoples untrained in the arts of representative government.”243 Decision-makers proclaimed “the United States [should
not] ‘incorporate the alien races, [or the] civilized, semi-civilized, barbarous, and
savage peoples of [the] islands into [the U.S.] body politic.’”244 A report by the
Committee on the Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico warned against the inclusion of
“people of wholly different character . . . and incapable of exercising the rights and
privileges guaranteed by the Constitution.”245 If a territory is inhabited by such people,
it argued, Congress should “withhold from [them] the operation of the Constitution
and the laws of the United States, and . . . hold the territory as a mere possession.”246
The Insular Cases, a series of cases decided from 1901 to 1922,247 employed these
negative cultural representations of territorial peoples as “savages” and warned of
serious consequences if such people became U.S. citizens “entitled to all the rights,
235

Go, supra note 215, at 54 (quoting the Governor of Guam in 1904 as stating that “[t]he
interests of the Naval Station and natives are intimately interwoven. The one, as an organization, cannot escape, or live far apart, from the other, and the efficiency of the first depends
entirely on the welfare of the second”).
236
See Quan, supra note 218, at 66.
237
Id. at 66–67.
238
See id. at 66; Na‘puti & Bevacqua, supra note 216, at 842–43.
239
See Ediberto Román & Theron Simmons, Membership Denied: Subordination and
Subjugation Under United States Expansionism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437, 452–55 (2002)
(discussing the United States’ use of race to justify the unequal treatment of native
inhabitants of newly acquired territories).
240
José A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire: Notes on the Legislative
History of the United States Citizenship of Puerto Ricans, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 432 (1978).
241
Juan Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Political Apartheid,
77 REVISTA JURÍDICA U.P.R. 1, 10 (2008).
242
Cabranes, supra note 240, at 432. See Efrén Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of
American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901–1922), 65 REVISTA JURÍDICA U.P.R. 225,
238–39 n.35 (1996); Román & Simmons, supra note 239, at 458; Torruella, supra note 241,
at 10.
243
Ramos, supra note 242, at 237–38.
244
Cabranes, supra note 240, at 432 (citing 33 CONG. REC. 3622 (1900)).
245
Román & Simmons, supra note 239, at 455 (quoting S. Rep. No. 56-249, at 8–9 (1900)).
246
Id.
247
See Ramos, supra note 242, at 228.
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privileges and immunities of citizens.”248 In doing so, the cases tightly circumscribed
territorial peoples’ rights in far-reaching ways—from the political to the economic,
and the social to the cultural.249
In Guam, in particular, the United States used alleged Chamorro racial inferiority
to justify de jure “segregation in schools and public spaces,”250 naval regulations that
outlawed marriage to Chamorros,251 and “post-WWII alienation of one-third of
Chamorro land on Guam to the military and government.”252 U.S. regulations in effect
barred many Chamorro cultural practices to “re-pattern and reconfigure Chamorro
practices into an ‘American’ form of existence.”253 After Guam suffered wartime atrocities under Japanese rule from 1941 through 1944, the “United States completely
destroyed the island with bombs in retaking it in 1944, leaving many [Chamorros]
without their homes or land to return to.”254 After the war, the United States seized
valuable tracts of Chamorro homelands as part of its ever-increasing strategic military presence on the island.255
Not only did the district court in Davis omit these racialized historical injuries,256
but its “racial purpose” analysis also conspicuously omitted the foundation for Guam’s
reparative-justice commitment to decolonization and remedy.257 In 1946, Guam was
added to the United Nations’s list of non-self-governing territories that have yet to
248

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901) (holding that the imposition of duties
on goods shipped between Puerto Rico and the continental United States did not violate the
Uniformity Clause, and introducing the concept of the unincorporated territory, in which territories belong to the United States but are not incorporated into it). See also Serrano, Elevating
the Perspectives, supra note 167, at 13–27 (describing the racialized underpinnings of the
Insular Cases).
249
Serrano, Elevating the Perspectives, supra note 167, at 6.
250
Monnig, supra note 219, at 23. See also RONALD STADE, PACIFIC PASSAGES: WORLD
CULTURE AND LOCAL POLITICS IN GUAM 105 (1998) (explaining that in the early twentieth century, the Navy outlawed the use of the Chamorro language in schools and on school grounds);
ROGERS, supra note 218, at 147 (reporting that in 1922, naval authorities collected and burned
Chamorro-English dictionaries).
251
See ROGERS, supra note 218, at 130 (noting that “Naval Station Order 47 in 1907 decreed
that the Navy Department ‘opposed [sic] marriages between Marines and natives except in
specially meritorious cases which must be referred to the [navy] Secretary’”); Monnig, supra
note 219, at 87 (explaining that in 1907 and 1919, the naval governors temporarily banned interracial marriage).
252
Monnig, supra note 219, at 23. See also Perez, Pacific Identities, supra note 232, at
459 (reporting that the United States confiscated large parts of land both before and after
World War II).
253
Monnig, supra note 219, at 85.
254
Natividad & Guerrero, supra note 216, at 3.
255
ROGERS, supra note 218, at 214–17.
256
See generally Davis v. Guam, No. 11-00035, 2017 WL 930825, at *14 (D. Guam
Mar. 8, 2017) (recognizing Guam’s “long history of colonization . . . and the desire of those
colonized to have their right to self-determination,” but omitting any analysis of that history
or the self-determination right).
257
See id. at *8.
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achieve full self-government, and it remains on the list today.258 The United States, as
the administering power, is required to submit periodic reports to the UN SecretaryGeneral regarding the steps it has taken to move Guam toward self-government.259
Guam’s Organic Act, adopted by Congress in 1950, designed a civilian government
for the island and gave residents—its native inhabitants—statutory U.S. citizenship.260
Through the Organic Act, Congress sought to further “the obligation assumed by the
United States under article 73 of the United Nations Charter to promote the political,
economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the non-selfgoverning Territories under United States administration.”261 Congress expressly
acknowledged these international obligations in the Organic Act’s legislative history:
In addition to its obligation under the Treaty of Paris, the United
States has additional treaty obligations with respect to Guam as
a non-self-governing Territory. Under Chapter XI of the Charter
of the United Nations, . . . we undertook, with respect to the
people of such Territories, to insure political advancement, to
develop self-government, and taking ‘due account of the political
aspirations of the peoples; . . . to assist them in the progressive
development of their free political institutions . . . .’262
Congress thus sought to uphold the United States’ international commitment to remedy
the “democratic deficits” at the core of the Guam-U.S. political relationship.263
But this right to self-determination was never realized.264 Despite the replacement
of a military government with a civilian one, the people’s multiple attempts to alter
Guam’s political status vis-à-vis the United States,265 and the struggle of Chamorros to
258

See Aguon, Other Arms, supra note 216, at 139–40.
See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960).
260
Organic Act of Guam, Pub. L. 81-630, 64 Stat. 384 (1950), codified at 48 U.S.C.
§§ 1421–28e (2012).
261
Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 7, at 17. See also U.N. Charter art. 73; Julian Aguon,
On Loving the Maps Our Hands Cannot Hold: Self-Determination of Colonized and Indigenous
Peoples in International Law, 16 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 47, 68 (2010) [hereinafter Aguon,
On Loving the Maps] (noting that in the Organic Act of Guam, Congress reserved the authority
to annul laws passed by the Territory).
262
3 GUAM CODE ANN. § 21000 (2000).
263
See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 7, at 7.
264
See id.
265
See Van Dyke et al., supra note 216, at 626–28 (describing self-determination movements
in Guam, including the 1980 creation of the Commission on Self-Determination to explore
political status options, the repeated introduction of the Guam Commonwealth Act to the
U.S. Congress, and Chamorro efforts to petition the United Nations to advocate for their right
to self-determination); see also Michael P. Perez, Colonialism, Americanization, and Indigenous
Identity: A Research Note on Chamorro Identity in Guam, 25 SOCIOLOGICAL SPECTRUM 571,
259
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attain the right of self-determination as Indigenous peoples,266 immense power remained
in U.S. government hands.267 Guam does not have its own constitution,268 and it is managed by the U.S. Department of the Interior.269 Because of this enduring colonial status,
the United States continues to reap the benefits of its strategic military presence on
Guam—including using the island for massive weapons storage270 and desecrating the
environment and sacred spaces271—without the consent of its native inhabitants.272
Guam’s challenged decolonization law thus aimed to further Congress’s limited
self-government commitment to those singled out for self-determination in Guam’s
Organic Act—Guam’s native inhabitants.273 According to Guam’s Legislature, the
right to self-determination “has never been afforded the native inhabitants of Guam,
its native inhabitants and land having themselves been overtaken by Spain, and then
ceded by Spain to the United States of America during a time of war, without any
consultation with the native inhabitants of Guam.”274 Expressly acknowledging
Congress’s responsibility to repair historical harms, the Guam Legislature sought “to
permit the native inhabitants of Guam . . . to exercise the inalienable right to selfdetermination of their political relationship with the United States of America.”275
Therefore, Guam contends that “those people made U.S. citizens by the Guam
Organic Act have never enjoyed equal U.S. citizenship rights[,]” and have never
realized their right to self-determination.276 “[T]his inequality explains, at least in
573 (2005) (describing the people’s belief that a Commonwealth political status would “increase the level of self-government while maintaining U.S. sovereignty and citizenship”).
266
See Van Dyke et al., supra note 216, at 626–28.
267
See Perez, Pacific Identities, supra note 232, at 460 (noting also that the U.S. President
retained the authority to claim portions of Guam’s land for military reasons); see also Van
Dyke et al., supra note 216, at 626 (observing that after seventy years of military control and
U.S. president–appointed governors, Congress finally permitted Guam’s people to elect their
first full-term governor in 1968).
268
Guam, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2017), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the
-world-factbook/geos/gq.html [https://perma.cc/6BAW-TRJJ] (noting that the “Guam Act
of 1950 serves as a constitution”).
269
See Aguon, Other Arms, supra note 216, at 138.
270
See generally Natividad & Guerrero, supra note 216; see also infra note 295 and accompanying text.
271
See, e.g., Natividad & Guerrero, supra note 216, at 10 (describing backlash over U.S.
military “desecration” of 2,200 acres of the Pågat region of Guam).
272
See Perez, Pacific Identities, supra note 232, at 461; Aguon, Other Arms, supra note
216, at 137–38; Van Dyke et al., supra note 216, at 629 (noting that the United States continues
to benefit militarily in Guam but has left unresolved the self-determination of its people).
273
See Opening Br. of Defs.-Appellants, supra note 124, at 78.
274
3 GUAM CODE ANN. § 21000 (2000). See also Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 7,
at 11–12 (contending that Guam’s Legislature acknowledges that the “‘native inhabitants’
remain due their right of self-determination by operation of the Organic Act, the U.N. Charter,
and other treaties of the United States”).
275
3 GUAM CODE ANN. § 21000.
276
Reply Br. of Defs.-Appellants at 7, Davis v. Guam (No. 17-15719) (Dec. 21, 2017).
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part, why the same people have the right of self-determination and can express their
views regarding decolonization.”277 And the law’s reference to ancestry serves to
identify the group of people entitled to that decolonization: native inhabitants
experienced U.S. colonization’s harms, and, as a result, their U.S. citizenship and
unfulfilled right to self-determination are tied to the political status of Guam.278
Thus, for Guam, extending Rice to foreclose any consideration of ancestry “would
prevent any present-day recognition of self-determination rights of colonized
peoples because those necessarily depend in part (but not entirely) on the question
of whether one’s ancestors experienced colonization.”279
While Guam’s decolonization law refers to “blood relations”280 or ancestry, and related laws single out Chamorros,281 those references do not convert a politically crafted
remedial law aimed at rectifying the harms of colonization to an Indigenous people into
an unlawful racial classification.282 The United States gained control over Guam’s land
and resources, and legitimated that colonization, in part by characterizing the Chamorro
people as inferior and unworthy, through negative cultural imagery about the group
and its ancestry.283 The restorative-justice approach to remedying those material and
cultural harms of colonization, therefore, must take into account that ancestry. Viewed
through this specialized lens, Guam’s plebiscite law was crafted as a restorative response to colonialism’s devastation: it was based on the assumption that the law’s
beneficiaries have a claim to reparation and self-determination that others do not.284
This reparative-justice approach to Guam’s decolonization law is also consistent
with the Fifteenth Amendment’s mandate, which prohibits the denial or abridgment of
the right to vote “on account of race.”285 Unlike in the Jim Crow context, Guam’s law
was not motivated by “prejudice and hostility”286 and, as such, did not seek to benefit
one group while vilifying another.287 Justice Stevens’s observation in Rice is particularly
277

Id.
See Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., supra note 103, at 14 (arguing that the plebiscite
law “simply carves out a class of colonized people”).
279
Opening Br. of Defs.-Appellants, supra note 124, at 2. See also Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for
Summ. J., supra note 103, at 14 (“If the Court were to accept Plaintiff’s invitation to broaden
Rice so significantly, it would be impossible for a colonized people to exercise any measure
of self-determination because the mere act of designating who constitutes the colonized
people would collapse into an act of racial categorization.”).
280
3 GUAM CODE ANN. § 21001(c) (2000) (“‘Descendant’ shall mean a person who has
proceeded by birth, such as a child or grandchild, to the remotest degree, from any ‘Native
Inhabitant of Guam,’ as defined in Subsection (e), and who is considered placed in a line of
succession from such ancestor where such succession is by virtue of blood relations.”).
281
See Davis v. Guam, No. 11-00035, 2017 WL 930825, at *11 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017).
282
See Opening Br. of Defs.-Appellants, supra note 124, at 5–6.
283
See supra notes 231–55 and accompanying text.
284
See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 545 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
285
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
286
Rice, 528 U.S. at 517.
287
See id.
278
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apt here: no similarity exists between a voting system devised to exclude a racial
group from voting and one that is “designed to empower politically the remaining members” of a people with a “special claim to self-determination.”288 The purpose of the
decolonization law is not to target race itself, but rather the damage of colonization.
Instead of engaging with this deep historical context, the district court’s historical omissions and formalistic analysis told a simple story of reverse discrimination
against white American Arnold Davis.289 From this perspective, the “native inhabitants” of Guam suffered no harsh impacts of U.S. colonization. Instead, they are just
another racial group, or, worse, a “favored” racial group attempting to wrest away
benefits from others.290 By ignoring the “roots and consequences of colonialism,”291
as well as the United States’ commitment to repair the resulting damage, the decolonization law’s attempt to afford native inhabitants a limited right to self-determination
was simply recast as promoting an illegal racial purpose.292
The court’s decontextualized approach, bolstered by the decades-long ideological attack on civil and human rights for people of color and Indigenous peoples,
masks the ongoing consequences of U.S. colonialism in Guam.293 Today, those
consequences include a U.S. military buildup slated for 2022294 that some fear will
trigger a “demographic change in the makeup of the island that even the U.S.
military admits will result in the political dispossession of the [Chamorro] people.”295
Because the native inhabitants did not consent to the seizure of their homelands to
house and test weapons of war, many consider the ever-growing military presence
in Guam “an intrusive force that runs roughshod over political sovereignty and
cultural identity.”296
288

Id. at 540, 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Davis. v. Guam, No. 11-00035, 2017 WL 930829, at *14 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017).
290
See Davis. v. Guam, CTR. INDIVIDUAL RTS., supra note 3.
291
Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 63, at 566.
292
See supra notes 259–63 and accompanying text.
293
See Perez, Pacific Identities, supra note 232, at 460.
294
See Aguon, On Loving the Maps, supra note 261, at 67.
295
Id. The buildup proposes doubling the size of the current U.S. military presence from
6,000 to 11,000, plus 1,300 dependents; the acquisition of land; and the construction of training
facilities—to add to the twenty-eight percent of the island already occupied by the U.S.
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CONCLUSION
In Davis v. Guam, Davis and his attorneys distorted the language of civil rights to
erase the history and effects of colonization on the native inhabitants of Guam. Davis’s
supporters called Guam’s decolonization law a “modern . . . version of Jim Crow
discrimination,”297 and Guam’s efforts to remedy past harms “racial separatism.”298
But for others in Guam, the case signifies the need for “concrete, albeit sometimes
symbolic, steps . . . in the name of restorative justice.”299 This type of repair requires
“a genuine act of decolonization [which] involve[s] the decision of those who were
colonized, not those who have come to the island because of its colonization.”300
From this view, Guam’s law plays a key part in repairing the long-standing damage of
U.S. colonization by offering a measure of self-determination to Guam’s native
inhabitants—even if based on ancestry. Because ancestry was integral to Guam’s
colonization,301 the appropriate restorative remedy must take account of that ancestry.
In reviewing Davis, the Ninth Circuit will therefore have two framing choices. It
could treat Guam’s present-day effort to restore native inhabitants’ self-determination
297
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not as a restorative measure but as a simple racial preference.302 It could do so by
discounting Guam’s history of colonization and by treating any mention of ancestry
as a proxy for race. Or, consistent with the notion of reparative justice, the court
could acknowledge that ancestry should not be treated as race, particularly in the
context of remedies for the harms of U.S. colonization. In doing so, the court could—
and should—incorporate the context of colonization, and its lasting damage to the
Chamorro people, to acknowledge that ancestry is key to repairing those harms.303
This latter approach recognizes Albert Memmi’s apt description of how race and
ancestry are deployed to justify colonization or political aggression.304 The colonizer, who portrays itself as civilized and law-abiding, uses negative cultural
imagery as a mechanism for justifying its political takeover of another country and
the resulting oppression of its people.305 This approach is also consistent with the
international human rights principle of self-determination, a principal tenet of
reparative justice, which is integral to colonized peoples’ efforts worldwide to repair
the damage of historical injustice.306
In Davis, as in many other controversies rooted in U.S. colonialism,307 the court
must ask if the law’s use of ancestry is crafted as a restorative response to colonialism’s devastation. This is the jurisprudential foundation of Mancari: the purpose of
such remedial measures is not to target race itself, but rather the damage of colonization.308 Therefore, a law based on this profoundly reparative-justice approach does
not convert an ancestral classification into one that merely aims to benefit one racial
group over another. Instead, it creates the appropriate nexus between the longstanding material harms of colonization and a meaningful present-day remedy.
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